WILDLIFE POLICY: A HISTORICAL ECHO (PART III)

Exactly 39 years and 21 years after the enactment of Sessional Paper No 7 of 1957/58 and Sessional Paper No. 3 of 1975 respectively, yet another wildlife policy document was produced. This was the Wildlife Policy 1996, which came after much deliberations and the benefit of a stout and well-informed public. But yet still it resonated with the sentinels of the previous game policy papers.

However unlike the previous two documents, Wildlife Policy 1996 never became a Sessional Paper as it was never tabled in parliament. As such its standpoints and recommendations simply became matters of intellectual discourse and were never binding on the government.

It is instructive to note, that through an amendment on the mouthful Wildlife (Conservation and Management) {Amendment} Act of 1989, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) was established 14 years after the proposal had been made by Sessional Paper No. 3 of 1975. The man who set up KWS was none other than the world famous larger than life paleontologist, Dr. Richard Leakey, who had horned his skills at the National Museums of Kenya (NMK).

Just how did KWS come about and more so Leakey’s appointment as the man at the helm of KWS? At that time Kenya’s national parks had lost face due to rampant poaching, mainly of elephants. To get to the bottom of this is the stuff of fiction. A beautiful and riveting story of the rigmarole that is Kenyan politics. It is still a wonder just how conservation is linked to politics.

In his book “Wildlife Wars: My Battle to Save Kenya’s Elephants” Leakey reveals:

“As my family and others can attest, I’m known for speaking my mind, a trait I probably inherited from my parents, Louis and Mary Leakey – neither of whom was renowned for tact. Yet, twenty-five years of public service had taught me patience. I realized that I couldn’t suddenly make a rushed announcement about corruption and incompetence. Moreover elephant poaching needed to be raised in a way that would bring to it a maximum amount of press attention. An opportunity presented itself in August 1989. I took full advantage of it.

“An ornithological conference was to be held at the museum, and Dr Perez Olindo [then director of the less fancied Wildlife Conservation and Management Department] and [tourism] minister George Muhoho [now Kenya Airports Authority CEO] and I were to convene it. The day before the conference, poachers shot and killed two wildlife rangers in Tsavo national park; the newspapers carried a brief mention of their deaths. When reporters arrived at the Museum to cover the conference I asked them whether they also wanted to meet with the Wildlife director and the tourism minister, to ask them about the murders. They replied that they were very keen to do so. .. I took a seat next to Muhoho and whispered to him that the press was eager to meet with him to talk about the importance of birding in Kenya’s tourism industry. I suggested that he might use the occasion to offer some reassuring statements about government action following the loss of the two rangers. Muhoho nodded his head; he’d be happy to do this. The trap was set.”

Well heeled in the shenanigans of Kenya politics Leakey was playing his cards close to his chest. Listen to his captive narration:

“Muhoho and Olindo sat together at the press conference; I kept to the back of the room. After a few remarks about Kenya’s wonderful bird life, Muhoho announced that every effort was being made to apprehend the elephant poachers. He pledged that the families of the murdered rangers would be fully compensated. A reporter asked him what the government was doing to stop the poaching. Muhoho replied that everything possible was being done, and that the situation wasn’t as bad as had been suggested. The press conference then broke up. While they were leaving several reporters asked me whether I had anything to say in response. I replied that I certainly did, and that I would be holding my own press conference at two o’clock that very afternoon. That, of course piqued their interest.”

That Leakey fully understood the power of the media and the workings of the Kenyan press coupled with the machinations of the Moi administration is not in doubt. Hear him:

“When I announced that what Muhoho had told them that morning was frankly untrue, a ripple of surprise moved through the room. Pens started flying across notebooks. I told the reporters that Muhoho had done no more than pay lip service to a national crisis that was clearly out of control, and that I for one wondered why the government was doing nothing. I likened the slaughter of our elephants to economic sabotage; elephants were the flagship species of our wildlife and the basis for Kenya’s biggest industry, tourism. The decimation of elephants and other wildlife therefore posed a direct economic threat to our country. It being allowed to continue, I suggested made it appear that powerful government figures must be involved. Indeed, Ii added a secret report existed that named names and I hinted that I had seen this report. I called on minister Muhoho to tell the citizens of Kenya the truth once and for all.”

Just what and how much did Leakey know about poaching? Was Leakey privy to the reasons why the two Sessional Papers were put in the freezer? As you might have guessed, what ensued next is a blitz of brickbats on the press between Muhoho and Leakey. Read on:

“Needless to say, the press loved it; here was Richard Leakey, well known personality and government employee, speaking out on the record. This was a new experience for them. For a week, newspaper headlines trumpeted ‘Leakey tells all about poaching’, ‘Names of poachers with minister, says Leakey,’ I had never been involved in such a bare-knuckled public fight. Muhoho didn’t waste time in counterattacking – ‘Muhoho accuses Leakey’ ran one headline. He resented what he perceived as my meddling and tried to frame it in racist terms, telling the press that I had revealed a ‘cheeky white mentality’ in believing that only whites were concerned about preserving wildlife.”

Leakey won both the battle and the war respectively. He took over from Olindo and was given express powers to transform WCMD into KWS. Muhoho on the other hand was transferred from the ministry.

Incidentally Leakey’s larger-than-life profile did not secede. In fact much of the blame and praise on his work at KWS is credited to his ego and gung-ho theatrics of management. Just as his entry into KWS was full of drama so was his tenure and eventual exit, via a politically charged Special Probe Committee chaired by W.K Kemei, in 1994. Of all state corporations KWS has had the highest turnover of CEOs and in the shortest time – 16 years - possible. The conundrum that is Kenyan politics has best been played in KWS. Indeed the wildlife body has been a theatre of the muckraking tragic-comedy acts that define the Kenyan political genre. Other than Leakey and conservation scholar, Dr David Western (now at the African Conservation Centre – ACC), none of the other directors left a mark at KWS.

Egos of the duo – Western and Leakey - became the discussion and rallying point of KWS other than on-the-ground conservation concerns. Leakey came with his ‘Zebra Book’ which defined the policy objectives to be followed for KWS in achieving its mandate, while Western came with his clarion call of “Parks beyond Parks”, which was the core of the Wildlife policy 1996. As such though Wildlife Policy 1996 had some good points - just like the previous Sessional Papers - it was never enforced.

To begin with Wildlife Policy 1996 admitted KWS’ difficulty in conservation, not to mention its limitations on the definition of wildlife:

“However the term ‘wildlife’ (as currently defined in Kenyan law) is neither explicit enough in referring to all life forms nor in recognizing the role wildlife conservation (particularly in protected areas) plays in maintaining such life forms and ecosystems…Although the mission statement concerns the conservation of all forms of life, in reality no single agency in Kenya has exclusive mandate in this regard. Conservation functions are divided between various government agencies, each with a limited jurisdiction defined by specific policies and legislation. The agencies include the Forestry Department responsible for forests, the Fisheries Department responsible for marine and freshwater life and Kenya Wildlife Service responsible for wildlife generally.”

Does this statement reverberate with an echo of yesteryears? Yes it does. Lawrence Robert Maconochie Welwood’s Game Policy Committee of 1956 reveals that all these three departments [fisheries, forests and game] were all under one ministry way back in Kenya Colony days. The Ministry of Forest Development, Game and Fisheries. The Wildlife Policy 1996 goes on to enumerate on the role of KWS

“Of all the institutions in the country, KWS alone has the legal mandate to conserve and manage wild animals. It also has the sole jurisdiction over national parks and an oversight role in the management of national reserves and private sanctuaries. Finally KWS has a legal mandate to enforce wildlife laws and regulation, conduct anti-poaching operations and ensure the safety of tourists within national parks. These functions should continue to be the top priorities for KWS. The social and economic changes occurring since a single wildlife agency was established in 1977 make it impractical for KWS to police and manage wild animals throughout Kenya. The establishment of KWS as a state corporation ostensibly charged with generating its own funds further limited its ability to conserve and manage wild animals everywhere. In addition, many landowners feel that they have a legitimate right to remove, conserve and mange wild animals on their land and already do so.”

Perhaps the Wildlife Policy 1996 most telling statement is this: “KWS’ role should be redefined to reflect both the biodiversity mission statement and the policy goals. With reference to the policy framework, this should include setting conservation priorities, establishing and mobilizing partnerships, identifying the threats to biodiversity and the incentives to conserve. Finally KWS should also be arbiter of the conditions for developing rights and contingent responsibilities.”

The James Kamunge committee that is tasked to review the country’s wildlife policy is yet another attempt to streamline the controversy-laden sector. Indeed there’s a lot of historical baggage to cut through. The commission has an uphill task of defining ‘wildlife’; reconcile forests, fisheries and game together by flipping through dozens of separate acts, Sessional papers, international conventions and national plans. The onus of tediously collecting and collating views from the public, encouraging sober debates and making hard choices are factors that should also be on their minds. It should also not be lost to the working group that a study on Kenya’s wildlife story is a tell-tale of intrigues and political posturing not to mention wasted opportunities.

Above all the Kamunge Review panel must remember, Maconochie Welwood (a member of the British peerage) had done a superb job, but his recommendations were discarded at the dusty shelves of the archives. The baseline however of the entire process will be to establish why there is a disconnect between ‘policy formulation’ and ‘policy implementation’. And that is the challenge, translating ‘formula’ into reality.

(The views expressed here are for the writer and not for Kenya Wildlife Service)

For your comments to be published, send to Gichuki Kabukuru, gichukik@kws.org